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Abstract: Against the background of the acknowledged importance of off-balance-
sheet exposures in the sub prime crisis, we seek to investigate whether this was a 
new phenomenon or common to earlier crises. Using a logit approach to predicting 
banking crises in 14 OECD countries we find a significant impact of a proxy for the 
ratio of banks‟ off-balance-sheet activity to total (off and on balance sheet) activity, as 
well as capital and liquidity ratios, the current account balance and GDP growth. These 
results are robust to the exclusion of the most crisis prone countries in our model. For 
early warning purposes we show that real house price growth is a good proxy for off 
balance sheet activity prior to the sub-prime episode. Variables capturing off-balance 
sheet activity have been neglected in most early warning models to date. We consider 
it essential that regulators take into account the results for crisis prediction in 
regulating banks and their off-balance sheet exposures, and thus controlling their 
contribution to systemic risk. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Public commentary on the sub-prime crisis has highlighted the role of banks‟ off-
balance sheet (henceforth OBS) activities (Barrell and Davis, 2008). Figures stressing 
the exposure of banks to OBS risks have been widely cited1. Structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, for example, were often lightly regulated with little 
capital cover, and the authorities were in some cases surprised by the volume of such 
activity that came to light in the crisis (Davis, 2009).  
 
Academic commentators have started to focus on the design and appropriate 
regulation of banks‟ OBS vehicles, but to our knowledge there are no formal 
systematic cross-country empirical investigations of the contribution of OBS activities 
to financial crises, despite the extensive literature on early warning models for banking 
crisis prediction (Davis and Karim, 2008). The lack of empirical work seems largely due 
to paucity of data and not from a lack of underlying justification. Indeed, both banking 
theory, suggesting that moral hazard arises from less regulated activities, and the 
sizeable impact OBS activities have had empirically on banks‟ profits, argue for a major 
effort to be made with research. 
 
In this paper we investigate the effect of off-balance sheet activity on the vulnerability 
of the banking sectors in 14 OECD countries to crises in combination with key 
regulatory, financial and macroeconomic variables. We are interested to see whether 
OBS activity was a crisis determinant across our entire sample (1980 – 2008), in which 
case transactions traditionally regarded as risk-reducing were systemically 
problematic, or whether OBS activity only started to raise crisis probabilities when it 
moved into risky securitisation associated with regulatory arbitrage in recent years. If 
the latter is true, OBS risks will be found to be a feature of the most recent crises only 
and hence will not add value to an early warning system based on our sample2. 
 
There are important policy implications of an analysis of OBS and crises: periods of 
structural change, when OBS income becomes associated with risky securitisation, 
may pose particular risks to financial stability. This paper demonstrates clearly that 
this was the case, showing for the first time that OBS activity contributed significantly 
to crisis probabilities after 2003. Expanding on our earlier work (Barrell, Davis, Karim 
and Liadze, 2010), we test this proposition on the banking sectors of Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US3.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the importance 
of OBS activity in the recent crisis and introduces measures of off-balance sheet 
exposures for OECD country banking sectors. Section 3 introduces the literature on 
banking crisis prediction and considers additional variables employed to predict crises. 
Section 4 covers the estimation and analyses the results of a logit model of the 
determinants of banking crisis probabilities that includes OBS. Section 5 discusses 
forecasting crises with logit models and Section 6 concludes.  
                                       
1
 See for example, Blundell-Wignall et. al.  (2008). 
2
 Our OBS measure will still serve as another example of crisis risk arising from financial innovation which is a 
feature of many historic banking crises (Davis, 1995).  
3
 Our choice of countries and of the time period we cover is constrained by the availability of data on capital ratios 
as well as on off balance sheet income.  
 
 
2 The relevance and measurement of OBS 
 
Traditionally, OBS activity was seen as a risk reducing tool whereby parent companies 
could venture into new business lines without exposing their shareholders to the 
concurrent risks; parents could hold minority interests in a legally separated entity 
which bore the risks instead. However the explosion of OTC derivatives trading by 
banks allowed them to generate increasing levels of non-interest income whilst 
securitisation allowed them to earn additional fee based income whilst placing the 
assets off the balance sheet. This raised profitability further by avoiding the need to 
hold costly regulatory capital against these assets.  
 
Acharya and Richardson (2009) note that the move towards securitization-generated 
income became a feature of market-based banking systems of several OECD 
economies. This was particularly pronounced in the period after 2003 in the US when 
asset backed security (ABS) issuance exploded, driven by banks‟ desire to avoid 
holding costly capital against their assets. Altunbas et. al. (2009) note similar 
strategies were adopted in Europe and date the acceleration of securitisation in 
European banks around the same time (post-2004). 
 
One way banks engaged in regulatory arbitrage was by removing assets off the 
balance sheet by holding asset-backed securities in SIVs and conduits, for which 
banks then sought asset-backed commercial paper financing. The other was holding 
other banks‟ AAA ABS tranches on-balance sheet, which required a low capital 
weighting. Acharya and Richardson (2009) suggest this regulatory arbitrage was the 
main cause of the sub-prime episode. Only the on-balance sheet form of regulatory 
arbitrage will be captured by conventional measures of capital-assets ratios, and even 
there, an unadjusted measure of bank leverage (as employed by Barrell, Davis, Karim 
and Liadze, 2010) rather than a risk-based capital adequacy measure would have 
captured risks better. 
 
The recent increase in OBS activity may also have been due to banks‟ desire to mimic 
the business strategies of their peers. Farhi and Tirole (2009) suggest the maturity 
mismatch within SIVs and conduits (between long-term mortgage-backed assets and 
the short term commercial paper used to finance them) was a structural feature of the 
business models of most banks which displayed strategic complementarities with their 
peers. When authorities bail out failing banks, society incurs a fixed cost which is only 
justified if sufficient banks need bailing out. Therefore, each individual bank correlates 
its risk exposure with other banks, such that OBS risks can become systemically high. 
 
As the recent crisis has shown (Barrell and Davis, 2008), capital adequacy and liquidity 
ratios that did not take into account the riskiness of OBS activities proved to be 
misleading. Whereas banks may have appeared healthy and compliant with regulatory 
rules, they were in fact weak due to the undercapitalization of OBS activity. The 
question arises whether this was a unique feature of the recent crisis or whether there 
are historical precedents.  
 
Accordingly, our aim in this paper is to take into account the degree of overall OBS 
activity by banks and its impact on systemic risk by introducing it in early warning 
models for banking crises along with other key macroprudential indicators. The first 
step is to estimate the amount of OBS activity of the banking system of each sample 
country. The literature on estimating OBS at a macro level is limited. One exception is 
Boyd and Gertler (1994) who questioned whether US banks‟ share of intermediation 
had been maintained by a shift to OBS activity.4 They used the rate of return for on-
balance sheet assets to derive a measure of OBS assets according to the scale of non-
interest income. It was assumed that non-interest income5 was generated by implicit 
off-balance sheet assets with the same risk and return characteristics as on-balance 
sheet activity as indicated by net interest income. The exception was fee-based off-
balance sheet activities (trust-type activities and service charges on deposits) which 
the authors classed as “non-risky” forms of income. The authors note that a similar 
form of capitalization of certain OBS activities that entailed risk exposure was required 
under Basel 1 for capital adequacy purposes (where this was to provide credit 
equivalents). 
 
Feldman and Lueck (2007) replicated the Boyd-Gertler calculations for US data up to 
2006. They found that capitalizing non-interest income gave a roughly constant share 
of banks in total intermediation despite a decline in the share of on balance sheet 
assets, illustrating the growing importance of OBS activity. They noted limitations to 
the Boyd-Gertler approach, notably the assumption that banks generate equal 
profitability from on and off-balance sheet assets, but nonetheless found it plausible. 
Clearly, if banks are more competitive in traditional lending than in non-interest 
generation,6 the latter could include a wider margin and hence OBS assets could be 
overestimated by this method, and hence its use as a way of calculating the share of 
intermediation undertaken by banks may be questioned. However, income from off-
balance sheet activities may contain information about the risk banks face, even if it is 
not a good measure of their assets. We focus on relative income shares below. 
 
Further relevant contributions are from Stiroh (2004; 2006) who examined the effects 
of the ratio of non-interest income to total income on measures of bank risk and 
return in the US. The author found that at the aggregate level, declining volatility of 
total income occurred over 1984-2001 despite rising volatility of non-interest income. 
Lower total income volatility reflects instead lower volatility of interest income. At a 
bank level, rising shares of non-interest income were associated with unchanged 
returns but higher risk. This work provides an a priori justification for expecting OBS 
activity, linked in the works cited above to non-interest income, to be associated with 
banking crisis risk at the macro level. 
 
                                       
4
 The pattern of growing non-interest income and its implications for intermediation were also noted by 
Rogers (1998), who pointed out that from the late 1960s onwards, US banks had reduced their reliance 
on interest income from traditional activities. Instead, they placed increasing importance on the fee-
based incomes they generated from securitization.  
5
 Non interest income comprises revenue from banks’ securitizations and other off-balance sheet and non-interest 
activities (which also include loan sales, backup lines of credit, and risk sharing through derivatives) as well as 
profits on proprietary trading, fees and service charges on deposits, securities underwriting fees and commissions 
on brokered securities transactions for third parties. However the non-interest income figures reported by the 
OECD do not decompose the revenues generated by these different activities. 
6
 De Bandt and Davis (2000) in a study of the competitiveness of banking systems found that the competitive 
position for interest-generating and non-interest generating activities varied between countries. In the US the non-
interest income market was found to be a more competitive than that for interest income, while in France the 
opposite was true. In Germany and Italy positions were comparable. 
Our methodology for deriving an OBS proxy using OECD banking sector data is 
detailed in Appendix 1. Unlike Boyd and Gertler (1994), we do not consider pure fee 
income as non-risky since often the demand for the related services is highly volatile, 
and the bank faces reputation risk across its whole range of activities if it runs such 
business lines badly. We can derive a ratio of OBS income to total income and thus 
find a proxy for OBS activity7 solely using information from banking sectors‟ income 
statements which consists of  non interest income and net interest income.  
 
Using our proxy, we find different patterns of OBS activity across countries as well as 
over time. The majority of countries exhibit higher ratios of off to total balance sheet 
activities over the second half of 1980-2007 as compared to the first half, although 
some show much stronger rises in OBS exposures than others. The lowest average 
ratios over the sample period are observable for Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway and 
Spain, while Denmark, France, Finland, Sweden and the UK have the highest average 
ratios. Denmark had historically high levels of mortgage securitisation, which explains 
its relatively high ratio. UK OBS activity grew strongly in the period up to 2006, as did 
that in the US. The ratio for Netherlands and the US is around the average for the 
countries in the sample.  
 
For countries having the highest ratios of OBS exposures, we observe non-interest 
income growing faster than net interest income, specifically over 2001-2007. For 
example, in the UK over 2002-2007, non-interest income grew by 14.7% per annum 
compared with 10% in 1996-2001, while net interest income growth fell from 9% per 
annum in 1996-2001 to 6.2% in 2002-2007. The hypothesis then is that a high or 
rising level of such OBS activity gives rise to heightened risk of banking crises, as in 
the subprime episode. 
 
3 OBS and crisis prediction 
 
The literature has developed a number of distinctive multivariate Early Warning 
Systems (EWS) for banking crises, including logit (Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998; 2005) and the binary recursive tree (Duttagupta and Cashin, 2008). The signal 
extraction approach (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) differs by being univariate. Davis 
and Karim (2008) show logit to be the best of the three estimators whilst Hardy and 
Pasarbasioglu (1999) and Beck et. Al. (2006) also demonstrate the merits of logit 
models. Accordingly we will adopt the logit approach to assess the impact of OBS 
activity and will use a binary banking crisis variable (1 for crisis, zero otherwise) based 
on the dating of Caprio et. al. (2003) and Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
 
In order to avoid omitted variables bias, it is essential to estimate the effect of OBS 
activity on banking crisis probabilities alongside a set of crisis determinants 
traditionally deemed important in the literature. This literature comprises two strands: 
the first class of logit crisis models estimated by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998; 2005) and the second class of logit models by Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze 
(2010). The latter append new variables to the Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache set of 
determinants for the OECD (1980 – 2006) and show that these “new” variables 
supersede the “traditional” determinants as OECD crisis predictors. We discuss the 
“new” variables first and then the “traditional” determinants. 
                                       
7
 We use the term “activity” rather than “assets” to illustrate that we are not seeking to derive the volume of 
implicit off balance sheet assets.  
 
The significant variables in Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) were unweighted 
bank capital adequacy8 (bank capital/total bank assets), bank liquidity ratios (liquidity 
as a proportion of total bank assets) and real house price growth. The reasons for this 
result are twofold – originally, crisis models tended to exclude the new variables due 
to lack of data for global samples, and secondly, crisis determinants have been shown 
to differ across country groups (e.g. between Asia and Latin America, see Davis, Karim 
and Liadze, (2011)).  
 
Capital adequacy and liquidity can be regarded as defences against crises, while 
historically low levels are commonly considered to be precursors to crises 
(Brunnermeier et. al., 2009). Capital is a buffer that protects banks against the 
variability of losses on non-performing loans which are a function of macro risks (e.g. 
interest rates and creditworthiness related to business cycle effects) and market risks 
(asset price depreciations and funding). Equally, liquidity ratios show the degree to 
which banks are robust to sudden demands for withdrawal by depositors or the lack of 
wholesale funds9.  
 
Crises are often the result of poor quality lending, especially in real estate markets, as 
is discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) but residential property prices are again 
only available consistently for OECD countries10. Where available11, property price data 
can enhance crisis forecasting ability; Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) showed 
that real house price growth is a better crisis predictor than domestic real credit 
growth.  
 
Although current account data is widely available, it is not commonly employed in the 
empirical literature12. However, recent work by Jorda, Schularick and Taylor (2011) 
suggests national crises tend to be driven by current account imbalances and that for 
the post-Bretton Woods era, crisis related recessions are more strongly associated 
with current account problems than normal recessions. Deficits may be accompanied 
by monetary inflows enabling banks to expand credit excessively and they also may 
accompany an overheating economy. This may both generate and reflect a high 
demand for credit, as well as boosting asset prices in an unsustainable manner. These 
trends may be exacerbated by lower real interest rates than would otherwise be the 
case. Current account deficits may also indicate a shortfall of national saving relative 
to investment and hence a need for the banking sector to access the potentially 
volatile international wholesale market. Consequently, we also add the current account 
balance to our set of “new” crisis predictors. 
 
                                       
8
 Often called “leverage”. Aggregate data were obtained from the OECD Banking Income Statement and Balance 
Sheet data. 
9 In this paper, we use a narrow liquidity measure defined as a sum of banks‟ claims on general 
government and the central bank, while total assets comprise foreign assets, claims on general 
government, central bank and private sector. This measure is more legitimate (in terms of crisis 
prediction) than broad liquidity since the latter includes corporate securities which may actually become 
illiquid during a financial downturn, as in the subprime episode. 
10
 We note that house prices are correlated with prices of commercial property, which has also been a source of 
major bank losses during financial crises, see Davis and Zhu (2009). 
11
 Our source for this variable is the National Institute of Economic and Social Research NIGEM database. 
12
 Hardy and Pasarbasioglu (1999) estimated logit models of crises for both advanced and developing countries 
and found that the current account was not significant. Using a probit approach, Eichengreen and Rose (1998) 
again found the current account insignificant as a predictor of banking crises in developing countries.  
To select our set of “traditional” determinants, we followed Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, (2005) who estimated over 1980-2002 for 94 countries with 77 crisis 
episodes13. Their potential predictors included real GDP growth, the rate of growth of 
real domestic credit, the real short term interest rate, and inflation. We also utilise 
these general indicators of economic activity. To accommodate the financial sector 
they included the fiscal balance, the ratio of money to foreign exchange reserves, the 
change in the credit to GDP ratio, the dollar exchange rate and changes in the terms 
of trade. Again, we utilise these variables, except for the latter three as they are more 
directly relevant to emerging markets than OECD economies. For similar reasons, we 
also excluded Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache‟s measures of institutional quality: real 
GDP per capita, law enforcement and deposit insurance14. 
 
4 Estimation and results 
 
As noted, we use the logit model for predicting crises (Demirguc Kunt and Detragiache 
(2005), Davis and Karim (2008)). The logit estimates the probability that a banking 
crisis will occur in a given country with a vector of explanatory variables X it. The 
banking crisis dependent variable Yit is a zero-one dummy which is one at the onset of 
a banking crisis, and zero elsewhere. Then we have the equation: 
   
it
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itit
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                        (1)           
where β is the vector of unknown coefficients and F(β X it) is the cumulative logistic 
distribution. The log likelihood function is:  
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Coefficients show the direction of the effect on the probability of a crisis, although the 
magnitude of the (marginal) effect is conditional on values of other explanatory 
variables at time t.  
 
By definition, early warning systems rely on lagged explanatory variables so as to 
predict ahead and provide policymakers with opportunities for preventative action. To 
determine the best lag structure we applied either 1, 2 or 3 lags to all explanatory 
variables, and undertook the three logit regressions and ranked them on the basis of 
the models‟ AIC criteria. The 1-lag model performed the best, followed by the 2-lag 
model. However, a 1-lag model could not be used as an early warning system since 
our OBS variable, a balance sheet item, would only be reported after the end of the 
accounting year and hence would not be available for forecasting purposes. 
Consequently we used the 2-lag model as the estimation start point. 
 
The literature suggests our main focus of this paper, the OBS effect, may have 
changed during the course of our sample period (1980 – 2008). As banks became 
preoccupied with securitisation and the benefits of regulatory arbitrage, the risk-return 
trade-off on OBS activity may have altered. We cannot compute these changes 
directly due to the lack of reported detail on banks‟ portfolio holdings of OBS assets, 
but the literature does identify the turning point between traditional risk-reducing OBS 
activity and risky securitisation. Acharya and Richardson (2009) date this switch to 
2003, around the same period (2004) that Altunbas et. al. (2009) cite for European 
                                       
13
 Beck et. Al. (2006) with a similar set of independent variables covered 1980-97, 69 countries and 47 episodes. 
14
 Deposit insurance exists in all our OECD countries and thus the dummy would show no variation. 
banks. To test the hypothesis that risky securitisation generated systemic risk, as 
opposed to traditional OBS activity (which was viewed as risk reducing), we use two 
OBS variables in our initial model: a general level of OBS activity (defined as the ratio 
of off-balance sheet income/ total income) and this same level interacted with a post- 
2003 dummy. If the latter is significant at the cost of the former we can attribute a 
particular risky effect to securitisation without having to know the relative risk-return 
trade-offs between normal OBS transactions and risky securitisation. 
 
Turning to our dependent variable, our dataset includes 23 crises in OECD countries. 
Over half the crises are from the World Bank Crisis Database covering 1974-2002, 
(Caprio et al 2003) as used in Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010). That paper has 
crises in Canada in 1983, Denmark in 1987, the US in 1988, Italy and Norway in 1990, 
Finland, Sweden and Japan in 1991, France in 1994, whilst in the UK there are crises 
in 1984, 1991 and 1995. For the crises episodes in 2007 and 2008 we have used the 
crises dates  from Laeven and Valencia (2010), who classified Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden in crisis by 2008 and the US 
and UK in 2007. The authors treat the 2008 crisis in the US and the UK as a 
continuation of 2007 crisis, while we treat 2007 and 2008 as individual crises since 
2008 was induced by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
 
A priori, we made no assumptions regarding the relative importance of our crisis 
predictors, even though Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) showed the “new” 
determinants to be superior to the “traditional” ones. We therefore adopt a general to 
specific approach whereby a starting regression accommodating our full set of 
determinants (lagged 2) is used to iteratively delete the most insignificant variable 
during each subsequent round of regressions. 
 
Table 1: General to Specific Estimation, 1980 – 2008. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0.234                     
(0.176)
0.25                     
(0.131)
0.229                     
(0.117)
0.234                     
(0.115)
0.234                     
(0.113)
0.273*                    
(0.063)
0.256*                     
(0.08)
0.28**                   
(0.05)
0.039**                     
(0.02)
0.04**                     
(0.017)
-0.33***                     
(0.00)
-0.516***                     
(0.001)
-0.316***                     
(0.00)
0.041***                   
(0.00)
0.039***                     
(0.00)
0.038***                     
(0.00)
-0.111**                     
(0.013)
-0.112**                     
(0.012)
-0.112**                     
(0.012)
-0.115***                    
(0.009)
-0.123***                     
(0.003)
-0.114***                     
(0.004)
-0.115***                     
(0.004)
-0.14***                     
(0.00)
-0.329***                     
(0.00)
-0.334***                     
(0.00)
0.039**                  
(0.016)
0.034***                    
(0.006)
0.036***                     
(0.003)
-0.302***                    
(0.00)
-0.315***                     
(0.00)
-0.293***                     
(0.00)
-0.526***                     
(0.001)
-0.525***                     
(0.001)
-0.524***                    
(0.001)
-0.329***                     
(0.00)
-0.514***                     
(0.001)
-0.438***                     
(0.00)
-0.471***                     
(0.00)
-0.457***                     
(0.00)
0.101                     
(0.223)
0.104                     
(0.202)
0.098                     
(0.211)
0.087                     
(0.244)
0.084                     
(0.256)
0.083                     
(0.262)
0.091                     
(0.212)
0.00                     
(0.273)
0.00                     
(0.279)
0.00                     
(0.291)
0.00                     
(0.296)
0.00                     
(0.295)
0.00                     
(0.297)
0.0154                     
(0.505)
0.015                     
(0.518)
0.015                     
(0.525)
0.02                     
(0.323)
0.017                     
(0.383)
-0.102                     
(0.496)
-0.102                     
(0.49)
-0.102                     
(0.49)
-0.042                     
(0.581)
0.048                     
(0.698)
0.056                     
(0.642)
0.058                     
(0.63)
-0.016                     
(0.729)
-0.011                     
(0.796)
0.018                     
(0.762)
Current Balance (% GDP) (-2)
Leverage(-2)
Regression Number
GDP growth(-2)
2003 Dummy*OBS Income/Total 
Income(-2)
Narrow Liquidity(-2)
Budget Balance(-2)
M2/Rreserves(-2)
Real Credit Growth(-2)
OBS Income/Total Income(-2)
Inflation(-2)
Real Interest Rate(-2)
Real House Price Growth (-2)
N
ote: *,**,*** indicate significance on 90%,95%,99% levels correspondingly 
P-values in parentheses, (-2) indicates a variable is lagged by 2 years. 
 
The results of this sequential elimination process are reported in Table 1. It can be 
seen that throughout all stages of the elimination process, the first five variables in 
the table (namely leverage and liquidity ratios, real GDP growth, the current account 
balance/GDP ratio and post-2003 OBS activity) are generally significant with slight 
variation in their parameters. The opposite is true for all the remaining variables, all of 
which were highly insignificant. In particular we find that the full sample off balance 
sheet ratio is eliminated in the process, suggesting that over most of the period it did 
not raise risks, but rather reallocated them properly. 
 
These results show that in OECD countries, growth in real output and lower defenses 
from less stringent bank regulation, along with current account imbalances and recent 
OBS activity were the most important factors driving the probability of a banking crisis 
occurring between 1980 and 2008. Although lax monetary policy and credit booms 
may at times contribute to banking crises, they are not the most powerful 
discriminators between times of crisis onset and other periods in OECD countries. The 
pertinent result is the significance of post-2003 OBS activity as opposed to the general 
level of OBS activity for the whole sample period. This clearly accords with the findings 
of Acharya and Richardson (2009), Altubas et. al. (2009) and other commentators 
who became concerned with the particular systemic risks associated with securitization 
prior to the sub-prime episode. As a result, the coefficient on recent OBS activity is 
positive and ceteris paribus, such activities raised the crisis probability in OECD 
banking systems. 
 
We check the in-sample performance of the final model using the sample average 
crisis rate as a cut off. As shown in Table 2, the false call rate when there is no crisis 
(known as the Type II error), is 29.0% and the false call rate when there is a crisis 
(known as the Type I error) is 30.4%. The overall successful call rate (both crisis and 
no crisis called correctly) is 71%, with 16 out of the 23 crisis episodes captured 
correctly at a cut-off point of 0.060815. These results stand up well against the wider 
literature. For example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) had a type II error of 
32% and a type I error of 39%, with an overall success rate of 69% at a threshold of 
0.05 for their most preferred equation. During the subprime period there is only one 
genuine false call in Canada, and a failure to call Germany, where the purchase of low 
quality US ABS to hold on balance sheet was the source of the losses that induced the 
crisis. Crises are called in Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Spain, the UK and the US, suggesting that the explanation is sound.  
 
Table 2. In sample performance of the model 
  Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=0.0608 252 7 259 
P(Dep=1)>0.0608 103 16 119 
Total 355 23 378 
Correct 252 16 268 
% Correct 70.99 69.57 70.9 
% Incorrect 29.01 30.43 29.1 
Using the in sample proportion of crisis years (0.0608) as a cut-off 
Note Dep is the (binary) dependent variable 
 
Looking in more detail at the in-sample performance of the model and specifically at 
false alarms (Type II errors), more than 30% of them occur in the three years prior to 
the onset of the crisis, indicating that our model, as well as identifying crises, is able 
to differentiate well between periods of financial stability and instability. To calculate 
an “adjusted” number of false calls, we specify an alternative call horizon following the 
early warning literature whereby only calls up to three years prior to the crisis are 
accepted16. This leaves us with 70 instead of 103 initial false calls. In the majority of 
cases, adjustment for timing significantly reduces the false call rate; for half of the 
countries this drops by between 30 – 40%. 
 
Table 3: Robustness Tests  
                                       
15
 Calculated as the sample mean for onset of crises i.e. 23/378. We could of course use some other cut off point 
for the crisis call, and this should depend on the weightings in the loss function for a false call when there is no 
crisis to the loss from failing to call an actual crisis. If we wished to set a cut off to call all crises then we would 
have around 283 false calls when there is no crisis. 
16
 A similar forecasting horizon is used by Borio and Drehmann (2009) which underpins the latest capital 
proposals by the Bank for International Settlements. 
Baseline
US 
Excluded
UK 
Excluded
Japan, 
Denmark & 
Norway 
Excluded
0.038***                     
(0.00)
0.038***                     
(0.00)
0.043***                     
(0.00)
0.039***                     
(0.00)
-0.14***                     
(0.00)
-0.139***                     
(0.00)
-0.15***                     
(0.00)
-0.165***                     
(0.00)
-0.293***                     
(0.00)
-0.255***                     
(0.002)
-0.303***                     
(0.001)
-0.245***                     
(0.005)
-0.457***                     
(0.00)
-0.491***                     
(0.00)
-0.491***                     
(0.00)
-0.446***                     
(0.00)
0.28**                     
(0.05)
0.315**                     
(0.044)
0.352**                     
(0.026)
0.312*                     
(0.073)
GDP Growth (-2)
2003 Dummy*OBS Income/Total 
Income(-2)
Narrow Liquidity(-2)
Current Balance (% GDP) (-2)
Leverage(-2)
 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance on 90%,95%,99% levels correspondingly 
P values in parentheses, (-2) indicates a variable is lagged 2 years 
 
To counteract the possibility that our results are driven by specific crisis prone 
countries, we ran robustness tests by eliminating the two countries that have the most 
crises in our sample: the US and the UK (3 and 5 crises respectively). A separate 
robustness exercise was conducted by eliminating Japan, Denmark and Norway 
simultaneously. These countries reported negative non-interest income at points 
during our estimation period which may have affected our constructed OBS variable 
such that the significance of post-2003 OBS activity hinges on these countries‟ non-
interest income series. The results of these tests are summarised (relative to our 
baseline specification) in table 3 which shows our results to be robust to the exclusion 
of the US and UK and also for Japan, Denmark and Norway. In particular, the shift in 
OBS activity after 2003 towards risky securitisation was not unique to the US or UK 
and as a result raised crisis probabilities in the OECD in general. 
 
It could be argued that our post-2003 OBS result is contingent on a particular level of 
banking system development because securitisation is greater in market based 
systems as opposed to bank based systems. We subjected our results to another 
robustness test by including a dummy to capture the level of banking system 
development in each cross-section. The dummy takes a value of 0 for market based 
economies (Canada, Denmark, Sweden, UK and the US) as indicated by Caprio et. al. 
(2003) and 1 otherwise, and we include it both as an intercept shift and as a shift 
factor for the OBS indicator. Table 4 shows the post-2003 OBS effect is independent 
of the level of banking system development and that it raised systemic risk in both 
bank and market based systems. 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness to Bank-based vs market-based systems 
0.297**        
(0.043)
-0.114**        
(0.013)
0.006        
(0.727)
-0.296***        
(0.001)
0.037***        
(0.005)
-0.63        
(0.308)
-0.471***        
(0.00)
Bank Dummy
Leverage(-2)
Variable
GDP growth(-2)
Narrow Liquidity(-2)
Bank Dummy*(2003 Dummy*OBS Income/Total 
Income(-2))
Current Balance (%GDP)(-2)
2003 Dummy*OBS Income/  Total Income (-2)
 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance on 90%,95%,99% levels correspondingly 
P values in parentheses, (-2) indicates a variable is lagged 2 years 
Bank dummy 0 in market based Canada, Denmark, Sweden, UK and US, one elsewhere 
 
There are a number of ways to investigate the importance of a variable to a logit 
model, with looking at marginal effects being the most common. However, in this case 
it is more useful to look at the effects of the change in OBS after 2003 by setting its 
parameter to zero in the estimated logit and projecting crisis probabilities over the 
period. In Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the US, where we 
called a crisis, we would not have expected one if there had been no change in off 
balance sheet activity after 2003, and there would only have been positive calls in 
Spain, the UK and France, where in the first two the current balance was poor given 
bank capital that was available, or liquidity too low given other factors in the latter 
two. This would suggest that a regulatory response to financial innovations was 
required, but that response would have had to rely on judgment not evidence, as we 
see below.  
 
5 Forecasting Crises 
 
By construction, our post-2003 OBS variable cannot be used for forecasting purposes. 
The lack of crisis observations between 2003 and 2006 makes it impossible to 
estimate a truncated sample model (1980 – 2006) which could be used to assess out-
of-sample ability via sub-prime crisis prediction. However there is a causal relationship 
between property price growth and OBS activity which we can exploit to construct 
such an early warning system. IMF (2009) identifies the positive effect that rising 
house prices had on sub-prime lending and associated securitisation prior to the sub-
prime crisis. We test Granger causalities between house price growth and OBS activity 
over the whole sample and in the post 2003 period using two lags. The results, 
summarised in Table 5, show unidirectional causality between house prices and OBS 
with the former appearing to drive OBS activity whereas the reverse causality does not 
hold. In other words, house price dynamics lagged three years can be used to proxy 
OBS activity post 2003 in our model.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Granger Causalities between Property Price Growth and OBS 
Activity 
 
all countries excluding USA only
1.72    (0.18) 1.60    (0.20)
4.13**    (0.02) 3.85**    (0.02)
(1980 - 2008)
OFF BALANCE SHEET does not Granger cause 
PROPERTY PRICES  (2 lags)                                                                               
F-stat (probability)
PROPERTY PRICES do not Granger cause OFF 
BALANCE SHEET (2 lags)                                                                              
F-stat (probability)
 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance on 90%,95%,99% levels correspondingly 
 
 
Table 6: General to Specific Estimation of Early Warning Model (1980 – 
2006) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
8
A 
(USA 
excluded
)
-0.058    
(0.242)
-0.061    
(0.187)
-0.062    
(0.183)
-0.064    
(0.166)
-0.06    
(0.181)
-0.064    
(0.163)
-0.089    
(0.163)
-0.082**    
(0.02)
-0.091**              
(0.016)
-0.555***    
(0.004)
-0.555***    
(0.005)
-0.559***    
(0.004)
-0.568***    
(0.003)
-0.532***    
(0.003)
-0.555***    
(0.002)
-0.482***    
(0.002)
-0.454***    
(0.002)
-0.431***    
(0.004)
0.073    
(0.124)
0.076*    
(0.066)
0.075*    
(0.066)
0.076*   
(0.06)
0.083**    
(0.028)
0.079**    
(0.038)
0.076**    
(0.038)
0.08**    
(0.037)
0.08**            
(0.044)
-0.804***   
(0.004)
-0.803***   
(0.004)
-0.795***   
(0.004)
-0.792***   
(0.004)
-0.726***   
(0.003)
-0.751***   
(0.002)
-0.685***   
(0.002)
-0.544***   
(0.00)
-0.521***      
(0.000)
0.034    
(0.278)
0.034    
(0.269)
0.034    
(0.257)
0.034    
(0.259)
0.033    
(0.25)
0.028    
(0.333)
0.021    
(0.333)
-0.115    
(0.525)
-0.108    
(0.537)
-0.088    
(0.369)
-0.082    
(0.384)
-0.081    
(0.384)
-0.083    
(0.385)
0.00     
(0.392)
0.00     
(0.369)
0.00     
(0.365)
0.00     
(0.378)
0.00     
(0.393)
0.107    
(0.575)
0.107    
(0.573)
0.111    
(0.555)
0.134    
(0.42)
0.014    
(0.824)
0.016    
(0.802)
0.016    
(0.799)
0.025    
(0.852)
0.017    
(0.89)
0.016    
(0.875)
Real Credit Growth(-2)
Regression number
Real Interest Rate(-2)
Budget Balance(-2)
Narrow Liquidity(-2)
Current Balance (% GDP)(-2)
Real House Price Growth(-3)
Leverage(-3)
OBS Income/Total Income(-2)
Inflation(-2)
M2/Rreserves(-2)
GDP growth(-2)
 
Note: *,**,*** indicate significance on 90%,95%,99% levels correspondingly 
P-values in parentheses, (-2) means a variable is lagged 2 years 
 
To construct our early warning system, we repeat the general to specific exercise for 
1980 – 2006 by including the level of OBS activity at 2 lags as before, but this time 
replacing the post-2003 OBS variable with house price growth at 3 lags, albeit over 
the whole period. Table 6 shows the deletion sequence of the variables, ending with 
the final specification which includes liquidity, capital adequacy, current account 
balances and property price growth as crisis determinants. Essentially, property prices 
capture the risky securitisation practices of banks prior to 2007 and the concurrent 
business cycle dynamics which made borrowing seem affordable and risky lending 
seem justified. To ensure this relationship is robust we re-estimate the model in 
column 8 but exclude the US where house price falls played a major role in the 
subprime crisis. These results, in column 8a, show that the link between property 
prices and securitisation was not driven solely by dynamics in the US, allowing us to 
utilise the model in column 8 as our early warning system. 
 
The in-sample performance (see Table 7) of this specification is good: 75% of crises 
during 1980 – 2006 are correctly identified with a cost of false calls in only 26% of 
non-crisis cases. The number of false calls in the three years in the run up to crises is 
noticeable, and we calculate them in Table 8, and if we include these as „true‟ (but 
early) calls the overall false call rate falls to 23.5 per cent. 
 
Table 7: In-Sample Accuracy of Early Warning Model (1980 – 2006)  
  Dep=0 Dep=1 Total 
P(Dep=1)<=0.0357 240 3 243 
P(Dep=1)>0.0357 84 9 93 
Total 324 12 336 
Correct 240 9 249 
% Correct 74.07 75 74.11 
% Incorrect 25.93 25 25.89 
(Based on Column 8, Table 6.) 
Using the in sample proportion of crisis years (0.0357) as a cut-off 
Note Dep is the (binary) dependent variable 
 
The out of sample performance should be evaluated in terms of the ability of the full 
model to call the sub-prime crises that occurred after the 1980 – 2006 estimation 
period. If this early warning model had been used for forecasting purposes in 2006, 
policy makers would have had at least a year to deal with the impending crises in the 
US, Belgium and France, as well as being in a position to recognise there might be 
contagion for such a sustained set of problems in these countries. Indeed, as we can 
see from Table 8 this model was flagging up the possibility of a crisis in the UK as 
early as 2004, and in Spain as early as 2005.  
 
Table 9 summarises the out-of-sample accuracy of our early warning model, which is 
the main purpose of this part of the estimation exercise. The model is able to predict 7 
out of the 11 crises that subsequently materialised. It misses the Netherlands, which 
was a spillover through a jointly owned bank (Fortis) from Belgium, and it also misses 
Denmark and Sweden, which was a marginal call, as well as Germany. In the latter 
case the implications of the purchase of US sourced ABS to hold on balance sheet 
were difficult to draw, but the systematic nature of warnings elsewhere should have 
been leading regulators everywhere to take account of the risk they were facing. As 
the assets were US housing market related, and this variable was indicating problems 
in the US, it should have been read as doing so in Germany as well. This out-of-
sample accuracy rate is extremely good in comparison to other crisis models in the 
literature such as those underpinning the latest Basel III capital regulations (see Borio 
and Drehmann, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: False Call Rates for In-Sample Prediction 1980-2006 
Belgium 1 0 1 0 1
Canada 7 1 6 0 6
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 5 1 4 0 4
3 prior 3 years (1994)
1 prior 1 years (2008)
Germany 0 0 0 0 0
Italy 2 0 2 0 2
Japan 3 0 3 0 3
Netherlands 2 0 2 0 2
Norway 3 1 2 2 0 prior 2 years (1990)
Sweden 2 0 2 0 2
Spain 3 1 2 2 0 prior 2 years (2008)
3 prior 3 years (1991)
2 prior 2 years (2007)
US 3 1 2 0 2
12 8France 13 1
Timing of  false callsTotal calls
Crisis 
called
False calls 
(as 
produced 
by model)
False calls 
prior to 
crisis
False calls 
after 
correction 
for timing
10 5UK 13 3
(
Based on Column 8, Table 6) 
 
 
Table 9: Out-of-Sample Prediction for 2007 and 2008  using the 1980 – 
2006 Model  
Belgium-08
Denmark-08
France-08
Germany-08
Netherlands-08
Spain-08
Sweden-08
UK-07
UK-08
USA-07
USA-08 P
P
P
P
P
OUT-OF-SAMPLE CRISES (2007, 2008)                                                                          
(Country-year)
CORRECT IDENTIFICATIONS BY 
MODEL
P
P
 
(Based on Column 8, Table 6, which proxies OBS with House Price Changes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 Conclusions 
 
The change in the nature of off balance sheet activity after 2003 from risk 
diversification towards regulatory arbitrage driven securitisation is widely believed to 
have left banks without sufficient capital to cover the risks they were facing. This 
paper demonstrates clearly that this was the case, showing for the first time that off 
balance sheet activity contributed significantly to crisis probabilities after 2003. 
However, it is not clear that this variable could have been used in an early warning 
system to call the subprime crisis, but movements in house prices are found to 
Granger cause our off balance sheet indicator and hence it is possible to substitute 
this into a warning system prior to 2006 . If we do so we show that it would have 
been relatively easy to call the subprime crisis in advance, and policy may have 
reacted. Going forward it is clear that policy makers should keep a close eye on 
financial innovations that change the structure of bank portfolios. It appears to be the 
case that before 2003 off balance sheet activity had no effect on increasing risk, and 
may have had a risk reducing effects, which were lost because of innovation and 
inadequate regulatory attention. 
 
Regulation more generally needs to respond to the risks posed by OBS activities, with 
controls needed at a macroprudential as well as a microprudential level. Reducing the 
scale and complexity of OBS activity may be essential, and there are several ways to 
do this. Registers and clearing houses may make certain OBS activities more 
transparent and easier to provision against (IMF, 2009). Requiring mandatory holdings 
or recourse on securitized assets may also be beneficial. Taxation or clearing houses 
to ensure registration of OTC derivatives might also be considered (see Barrell and 
Weale (2010), Singh (2010)). Of course other problems may emerge and financial 
innovations may get round new regulations, as Goodhart (2008) discusses. Hence 
there is a need for continuous monitoring and adaptation of regulation of banks and 
financial markets. 
 
Overall, our findings can be considered as a step towards quantifying the effect OBS 
activity has on the probability of a crisis occurring, as well as in overall crisis 
prediction. Further investigation in this area can be conducted once more detailed 
data are available, which will allow researchers to adjust banks liquidity and leverage 
ratios for the size of the OBS exposures directly and test for an impact on crisis 
probabilities more precisely. Given how essential such calculations are, we would 
suggest direct regulatory action (to produce that data) would be wise. 
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY AND DATA ISSUES 
 
We use total non-interest income as the basis of our measure of OBS activity, and net 
interest income as a measure of on balance sheet activity, adjusting each for 
provisions. Our approach is distinct from Boyd and Gertler (1994) in that we take the 
ratio of these two aggregates from the income statement as an indicator of off 
balance sheet activity (adjusted for provisions) for 14 countries. In contrast, Boyd and 
Gertler use US data and adjust OBS activity down for fee-based off-balance sheet 
activities, estimate a figure for implicit OBS assets and compare it with figures for on 
balance sheet assets. We consider that fee-based income is far from risk-free due to 
risk of volatile demand for such services as well as reputation risks that may arise 
from it. Hence the inclusion of such activity in total OBS activity is in our view 
justified17.  
 
Accordingly our measure is as follows: 
 
OFF/(ON+OFF)=[Y*(1-P/(Y+(I-E))]/{[(I-E)*(1-P/(Y+(I-E)))]+[Y*(1-P/(Y+(I-E))]}
 (1) 
 
Where OFF is the measure of off-balance sheet activity, ON is on balance sheet 
activity, Y is non interest income net of expenses, I is interest income, E is interest 
expenses and P is provisions, which are allocated on and off balance sheet in 
proportion to net income.18  
 
The variables used to construct the OBS estimate, net interest income, net non-
interest income and provisions are reported in aggregate form for each banking sector 
in the OECD Banking Income Statement and Balance Sheet online database for our 
sample period. Due to the aggregation of reported figures it is not possible to 
decompose net non interest income into the proportion generated by traditional OBS 
activity and that which is generated by risky securitization. 
 
There were a few missing observations in the data which were either filled in by using 
data sources most comparable with the major data source or in a minority cases by 
applying average growth for 3 preceding years. There were cases when negative non 
interest income in Japan, Norway and Denmark lead to the negative sign on the 
constructed OBS proxy variable. In our view, while Japanese, Norwegian and Danish 
banking systems may have faced some stresses around the time of the negative 
observations, we still need to consider if these negative figures for estimated OBS are 
realistic. We decided that a more appropriate method was to assume that OBS activity 
on a gross basis can become zero but cannot be negative. 
 
The resulting ratios for OBS activity are presented in the table A1. It can be seen that 
the majority of countries exhibit higher ratios of off- to total balance sheet income 
over the second half of the 1980-2007 period as compared to the first half, although 
some show much stronger rises in OBS exposures than others. We chart OBS activity 
                                       
17
 The heterogeneity of non-interest income means that it is more appropriate to use the term OBS activity rather 
than OBS assets. 
18
 We acknowledge that provisions are mainly for on-balance sheet loans and for on and off balance sheet 
securities so this adjustment may induce a slight downward bias to the measure of off-balance-sheet activity. 
ratio for the US for the entire sample period for illustrative purposes and can clearly 
observe a considerable increase in OBS activity since 1995.  
 
 
Table A1. Ratio of off balance sheet activity to total bank income  
Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Japan Neths Norway Spain Sweden UK US
1980 0.13 0.23 0.40 0.40 0.17 0.23 0.37 0.26 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.35 0.29 0.27
1985 0.22 0.27 0.67 0.54 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.19 0.41 0.39 0.35
1990 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.50 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.38 0.21 0.29 0.48 0.38
1995 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.63 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.35 0.25 0.27 0.34 0.46 0.34
2000 0.52 0.57 0.49 0.40 0.66 0.43 0.40 0.08 0.49 0.28 0.40 0.54 0.46 0.43
2003 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.58 0.62 0.37 0.36 0.16 0.43 0.29 0.37 0.46 0.54 0.45
2004 0.36 0.50 0.48 0.40 0.65 0.26 0.35 0.07 0.43 0.28 0.36 0.45 0.61 0.43
2005 0.39 0.52 0.48 0.34 0.62 0.40 0.35 0.13 0.47 0.30 0.38 0.52 0.63 0.43
2006 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.38 0.77 0.38 0.43 0.09 0.52 0.29 0.44 0.69 0.65 0.44
2007 0.63 0.54 0.52 0.43 0.80 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.57 0.30 0.43 0.58 0.61 0.45  
Chart A1. Ratio of off balance sheet activity to total income for the US 
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 Table A.2: Data Sources 
 
NIGEM database
IMF (IFS)
NIGEM database
Main Source
OECD
IMF (IFS) (and FSA for the UK)
NIGEM database
OECD (and FSA for the UK)
NIGEM database
IMF (IFS)
OECD
NIGEM database
NIGEM database
Variable
Inflation
Real Interest Rate
GDP growth
2003 Dummy*OBS Income/Total Income
Narrow Liquidity
Current Balance (% GDP)
Real house Price Growth
Real Credit Growth
Leverage
Budget Balance as % GDP
M2/Rreserves
OBS Income/Total Income
NIGEM stands for National Institute Global Economic Model, National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research  
 
